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I INTRODUCTION
Historical Background
Satellites are two-edged swords They have a beneficial role in arms 
control, confidence building, and conflict resolution For example, if war 
were ever to break out between the superpowers, whatever hope there would be 
for controlling the conflict and bringing it to an early end would largely 
center on information gained from satellite surveillance, on control of stra­
tegic forces via satellites, and on the use of satellites for communication 
between the leaders of the U S and the Soviet Union On the other hand, the 
unique ability of satellites to see, to hear, and to transmit communications 
greatly increases the effectiveness of the military forces that they serve 
Hence satellites become extremely tempting targets as soon as hostilities are 
imminent
In the 1960 s both the U S and the Soviet Union deployed extremely crude 
ASAT systems In 1975, the U S dismantled its remaining system and took the 
position that its national security would be served best if it abstained from 
testing ASAT weapons During this period the Soviet Union sporadically tested 
its primitive and relatively unreliable ASAT weapon
In the late 1970 s the U S continued to claim a weapon-free space en­
vironment as its goal, but changed its approach The new U S approach had 
two parts a military program to develop a sophisticated new ASAT weapon and a 
diplomatic initiative to draft a treaty with the Soviet Union that would ban 
the testing and deployment of ASAT weapons The Soviet Union responded by 
declaring a unilateral moratorium on testing of its ASAT weapon and entering 
into negotiations Several negotiating sessions were held during 1978-79, but 
these talks did not lead to an agreement during the Carter administration and 
have not been pursued by the Reagan administration. In the meantime, both the 
U S and the Soviet Union have continued their ASAT programs
The Current Situation
In August 1981 the Soviet Union submitted to the United Nations a draft 
treaty calling for a "prohibition on the stationing of weapons of any kind in 
outer space " From the perspective of Western analysts, this draft had sever­
al important defects Although the Reagan administration did not respond, the 
Soviet Union nevertheless submitted a heavily revised draft in August of this 
year that meets most of the criticisms of Western commentators Recent public 
statements by the Soviet leadership, including Secreatry Andropov, appear to 
indicate a serious interest in constraining the Soviet-U S competition in 
space weaponry in general, and in banning ASAT systems in particular The 
Soviets have, for example, offered to dismantle their current ASAT system 
The U S has not responded to these initiatives, nor has it offered any 
rationale for its failure to respond
If the U S continues to refuse to negotiate and an era of intense 
competition in space weaponry begins, then even if one competitor does, on 
occasion, enjoy a fleeting advantage, the national security of both super­
powers will inexorably erode, for several reasons First, any threat to 
satellites, whether real or potential, will undermine confidence in the abili-
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ty to detect and respond to an attack in a controlled Wc*y Awareness that 
satellites are at risk will therefore tend to destabilizè "rises Second, a 
fierce competition in the development and testing of ASVT weapons is certain 
to cause friction, increase suspicions, undermine confidence in deterrence, 
and may inadvertently spark a confrontation Third, should ASAT technologies 
evolve to a level of potential anti-ballistic missile (ABM) capabilities, this 
would have far-reaching and unfortunate consequences for strategic stability
In trying to forsee the consequences of competition in space weaponry, 
the history of MIRV technology is both instructive and disturbing In the 
1960 s Soviet leaders failed to forsee that the U S would develop and deploy 
MIRVs in response to Soviet deployment of a primitive and ineffective ballis­
tic missile defense around Moscow The U S proceeded with deployment of 
MIRVs even after a treaty tightly limiting ABM systems was concluded This 
deployment coupled with increased warhead accuracy rendered more than 50/ of 
Soviet strategic nuclear warheads theoretically vulnerable Nor did U S 
leaders forsee that the temporary strategic benefit the U S achieved by 
deploying MIRVs would eventually boomerang, making the 25/ of U S nuclear 
weapons that are silo-based theoretically vulnerable Today, finally, there 
is a broad consensus that U S security would be far greater had the U S not 
introduced MIRVs Nevertheless, there is a strange reluctance to recognize 
that this painful lesson applies directly to current developments in the arms 
race, including space weaponry
The Importance of Negotiated Restraint
It is in the long-run interests of both the U S and the Soviet Union to 
minimize the likelihood of conflict in space This is especially true for the 
United States, which is more dependent on satellite systems than is the Soviet 
Union Because of this dependency, it makes more sense for the US to limit 
the potential threat from Soviet ASATs than to prepare to attack Soviet satel­
lites The threat of Soviet ASATs can only be effectively reduced by an 
agreement banning the further testing or deployment of such systems Negoti­
ations for such an agreement can build on the established body of inter­
national law represented by the Test Ban Treaty, which forbids nuclear explo­
sions in outer space, the Outer Space Treaty, which bans the basing in space 
of weapons of mass destruction, and the ABM Treaty, which bans space-based ABM 
systems and protects satellites serving as "national technical means of veri­
fication "
Aside from these conclusions, which follow from a strictly military 
conception of national security, important political factors also provide a 
strong incentive for negotiations In the United Nations General Assembly, 
the allies of the US have proposed a resolution requesting the U N  Commit­
tee on Disarmament to "consider as a matter of priority the question of 
negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite 
systems" There is every indication that the allies of the US will propose 
that matters move from "considering the question of negotiating" to actual 
negotiations
As will be discussed in subsequent sections, the hazards for the US of 
a totally uninhibited competition in space weaponry are far greater than those 
that would exist with a good ASAT treaty in force The risks that would 
remain even with such a treaty can be reduced to acceptable levels by defen-
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sive measures costing much less than the programs that would be necessary if 
there were no negotiated restraints Furthermore, in the absence of nego­
tiated restraints, such defensive measures are almost certainly doomed to 
failure
Finally, the current status and potential capabilities of the US ASAT 
system are so much more advanced than those of the Soviet system that, should 
negotiations for an ASAT treaty fail or such a treaty be abrogated or violated 
by the Soviet Union, the security of the U S would not be jeopardized
A
II CURRENT U S AND SOVIET SPACE ASSETS AND ASAT CAPABILITIES
U S and Soviet Space Assets
Satellites and other devices in space are referred to as space assets 
U S space assets include optical reconnaissance satellites that take pictures 
of objects on land and sea Some survey wide areas whereas others are design­
ed to zoom in to take high-resolution pictures of objects of special interest 
The U S also has infrared sensor satellites that detect the exhaust from 
missiles launched on land or at sea and electronic intelligence satellites 
that intercept Soviet communications signals and telemetry from Soviet mis­
siles in flight In addition, the U S has nuclear explosion detectors that 
use optical, X-ray, and gamma-ray detectors to spot nuclear explosions on the 
earth or in space These satellites give the U S prompt, precise, and irre­
placeable intelligence about Soviet strategic forces, and provide an invalu­
able view of many other aspects of Soviet military capabilities and activi­
ties Because of the relative openness of U S society, the Soviets are much 
less dependent on satellites for gathering intelligence on U S forces and 
activities
The U S also depends on satellites for secure, long-distance communi­
cations with U S forces around the globe Approximately 70 percent of U S 
long-haul military communications now go via satellites, there are no facili­
ties on the earth s surface that could provide a satisfactory replacement for 
this system Soviet military forces are mainly on the Eurasian land mass and 
can, if necessary, communicate without the help of satellites
The vulnerability of a satellite to attack is largely determined by the 
nature of its orbit Most fall into three categories geosynchronous orbits, 
in which the satellite is stationary above a point on the earth s equator at 
an altitude of about 22,000 miles, semi-synchronous orbits, with altitudes of 
about 12,000 miles, and low-earth orbits, with altitudes less tjhan 1,000 
miles Satellites can also be placed in highly elliptical orbits that dip as 
low as several hundred miles and rise as high as 22,000 miles Some U S 
satellites are in orbits that are considerably higher than 22,000 miles
US ASAT Capability
The U S first deployed an ASAT system in 1964, based on the Army s Nike- 
Zeus antiballistic missile (ABM) interceptor This system was deactivated in 
1967 The U S began to test a second, Air Force ASAT system in March 1964 
This series of tests was code-named SQUANTO TERROR The very first test was a 
success, and the system was declared operational in 1964 after two more suc­
cessful tests The Air Force ASAT system consisted of a Thor missile armed 
with a nuclear warhead and based on Johnston Island m  the Pacific The 
missile could launch the warhead on a trajectory to intercept the approaching 
target satellite When it had approached close enough to the target (separa­
tions of less than a nautical mile were achieved in 1965), the warhead could 
be detonated and the resulting radiation would destroy the target satellite 
Between 1964 and 1968 the Air Force reportedly carried out sixteen SQUANTO 
TERROR tests
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These first U S ASAT systems had one serious disadvantage explosion of 
the nuclear warhead would not only destroy the target satellite, but would 
also damage or destroy many other satellites in earth orbit, including U S 
communications and surveillance satellites For this reason the system was 
not very practical and in fact was dismantled in 1975 However, this system 
can reportedly be restored to operational status on six months notice
The current U S ASAT system is based on quite different principles The 
interceptor is the so-called Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV), which is launched 
from an F-15 fighter plane and boosted into space by a two-stage rocket The 
first stage is powered by a SRAM engine while the second stage is a Vought 
Altair Three The whole package is quite small, less than 18 long and 20" in 
diameter and weighing about 2,600 pounds When released, the MHV interceptor 
is traveling at some 30,000 miles per hour The MHV itself is a 12" by 13" 
cylinder that seeks the target satellite and steers toward it using a combina­
tion of 8 infrared telescopes, a ring-laser gyroscope, and a set of 56 small 
rockets It destroys the target satellite by direct impact
In its present form, the current U S ASAT cannot attack geosynchronous 
satellites, but this is not a significant disadvantage at this time because 
almost all Soviet satellites are in low or highly elliptical orbits By using 
a three-stage instead of a two-stage booster, the U S system should be able 
to attack geosynchronous satellites
The U S ASAT weapon is portable and could be launched by an F-15 from 
airbases around the globe A special "kit" is being prepared that will allow 
Air Force ground technicians to convert virtually any F-15, stationed anywhere 
in the world, into an ASAT launcher in about six hours When properly fitted 
F- 15s are available, the time from alert to destruction of the target is 
supposed to be less than one hour (about two-thirds of an orbital revolution 
for satellites in low earth-orbit, a much smaller fraction of a revolution for 
satellites in higher orbits) Because the U S ASAT weapon can be launched 
from any of numerous F-15s based around the world, the U S could in principle 
launch a large number of them within a few minutes, knocking out many Soviet 
satellites without warning
The first test of the MHV is supposed to take place this month, with 
tests against targets in space coming early in 1984 The MHV is supposed to 
become operational in 1985
Soviet ASAT Capability
The Soviets began testing an ASAT weapon in 1968 that is extremely primi- 
tve by comparison with the current U S ASAT weapon and appears to be rela­
tively ineffective It works in the same way as the first U S ASAT weapons 
It is launched from the ground by the large, heavy, liquid-fueled Soviet SS-9 
missile into an orbit close to that of its target The interceptor then 
crosses the path of its target after one or two orbital revolutions, whereupon 
its conventional warhead explodes If it is close enough, the resulting 
shrapnel would destroy the target satellite
The highest altitude reached thus far by the Soviet interceptor is re­
ported to be 1,400 miles Therefore, the current Soviet system only threatens 
satellites in low-earth orbits Only about a third of all US satellites are
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in this category, and their most important national security contributions are 
photographic reconnaissance and electronic intelligence gathering U S sat­
ellites responsible for early warning, nuclear attack assessment, additional 
electronic surveillance, and military communications are in very high orbits, 
and are not vulnerable to the current Soviet ASAT In addition, the Soviet 
ASAT has only been tested against targets m  orbits with inclinations between 
62 and 66 degrees to the equator, suggesting some kind of operational limita­
tion. The only U S military satellite with a low-earth orbit in this range 
of inclinations is the Navy s ocean reconnaissance satellite
It would appear difficult to modify the Soviet ASAT so that it could 
threaten targets in higher orbits If attempted, the resulting weapon would 
be even more cumbersome
Because it requires the heavy SS-9 missile to boost it into orbit, the 
Soviet ASAT can only be launched from a handful of missile launch pads at 
Baikonur and Plesetsk in the Soviet Union Since a particular launch site 
passes under a given satellite orbit at most twice a day, a Soviet attack on 
U S satellites might have to be spread over as much as twelve hours In 
addition, few US satellites could be attacked in such a short time, because 
of the limited Soviet launch facilities
The Soviet ASAT system has been tested sporadically since 1968, reported­
ly only about half of the twenty tests carried out through 1982 have been 
successful Apparently the Soviets have not yet settled on a target-finding 
device Initially, they used active radar guidance However, one out of 
three tests of this target-finding method since 1976 have failed Further­
more, such a system is relatively easy to confuse by jamming or spoofing 
More recently the Soviets have tried out passive infrared sensors, but all six 
tests m  this series failed, including the most recent one m  June 1982
Clearly, the Soviet ASAT is not operational in any meaningful sense In 
fact, during SALT II hearings Air Force Chief of Staff General Lew Allen noted 
that "it is difficult to assign it a very high degree of credibility because 
it has not been a uniformly successful program and they have changed parame­
ters with many of the different launches they have made we give it a very 
questionable operational capability for a few launches it is a threat that 
we are worried about, but they have not had a test program that would cause us 
to believe it is a very credible threat "
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Summary
Current U S and Soviet space assets and ASAT capabilities are summarized 
in Table 1 This table shows that the United States would risk little if U S 
and Soviet ASAT programs were suspended at this time, while negotiations take 
place If, for one reason or another, the United States would find it neces­
sary to resume its development program, it could have an operating ASAT syfl- 
tem, capable of attacking all important Soviet space assets, within a year or 
two On the other hand, the Soviet ASAT system, though now called "operation­
al" by the U S Department of Defense, poses only a rather clumsy threat to 
the least important U S space assets, and has little potential for attacking 
the warning, communications, and navigation satellites on which US strategic 
forces depend Were negotiations to fail or were a treaty banning ASAT sys­
tems to break down, the U S would not have lost anything significant
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TABLE 1 COMPARISON OF CURRENT U.S, AND SOVIET ASAT POSITIONS
Characteristic USSR USA
Location of most assets low-earth orbits high orbits
Current ASAT system 
capability
can only attack targets 
in low-earth orbits
can only attack targets 
in low-earth orbits
Intercept method indirect (requires one 
or two orbits)
direct ascent from any 
direction
Launch sites few, fixed numerous, mobile
Potential launch rate very low high
Current status called operational by 
U S Defense Dept
ready for flight 
testing
Potential for 
improvement
poor good
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Ill SHOULD THE U S PURSUE AN ASAT TREATY WITH THE SOVIETS’
Why Build ASAT Weapons’
Three purposes have been given for U S development and deployment of 
ASAT weapons
(1) to attack Soviet satellites that can be used to target U S 
military forces,
(2) to protect US satellites by deterring the Soviets from 
using ASAT weapons to attack them, and
(3) to try out technology being developed for ballistic missile 
defense (BMD)
The first purpose can best be achieved by other means, the second is unlikely 
to be achieved by U S ASATs and would become unnecessary if testing and 
deployment of ASAT weapons were banned, while the third is unnecessary and of 
little value in any case
The Soviet satellites of most concern to U S military planners are their 
Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites (RORSATs) and Flectronic Ocean Recon­
naissance Satellites (EORSATs) which can locate ships at sea A U S  capabil­
ity to attack these satellites would be unlikely to play a crucial role in 
protecting U S naval forces for several reasons
First, unless the U S attacks the Soviet Union first, the Soviets would 
have gathered the satellite information needed to target U S forces before 
initiating hostilities Thus, whereas attacking Soviet reconnaissance satel­
lites in a time of tension would be very likely to precipitate war, attacking 
after a conflict has started would do little good
Second, even if the U S successfully destroyed Soviet reconnaissance 
satellites at the beginning of hostilities, the Soviets could launch a series 
of replacement satellites to maintain the flow of targeting information for 
some time
Third, the Soviets do not depend solely on satellites to target U S 
naval forces, but have a variety of sea-based and airborne reconnaissance and 
targeting systems Thus, destruction of Soviet reconnaissance satellites 
would not eliminate the threat to U S naval forces
Fourth, Soviet reconnaissance satellites can be defeated by means other 
than direct attack, including the use of decoys, camouflage, and electronic 
countermeasures
Given that the U S  is much more dependent on satellites than is the 
Soviet Union (as described in last month s article), Soviet attacks on U S 
satellites are unlikely to be deterred by any U S ASAT capability More 
certain protection for U S satellites would be obtained by denying the So­
viets any opportunity to test and deploy ASAT weapons through negotiated 
agreements The residual risks could then be successfully countered by
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hardening and diversifying U S satellites and by supplementing them with 
other systems wherever possible
A discussion of the likely consequences of developing and testing BMD 
systems lies outside the scope of the present article However, satellites 
are such fragile devices compared to ballistic missile re-entry vehicles that 
testing BMD systems against them would prove little
The Future Without an ASAT Agreement
In the absence of a negotiated agreement restricting ASAT testing, the 
U S and the Soviet Union are likely to begin an intense competition in ASAT 
weaponry
The Soviets may be expected to improve their current interceptor, so that 
it is more reliable, can attack satellites in higher orbits, and is resistant 
to deception or confusion by likely U S countermeasures The Soviets may 
also be expected to intensify their efforts to develop more sophisticated ASAT 
weapons, such as kinetic energy hit-to-kill interceptors like the U S minia­
ture homing vehicle, laser weapons to blind or destroy U S satellites, and 
space mines, which would stalk their orbiting targets in peacetime and explode 
on command at the start of hostilities With time, the Soviets would increase 
the number of ASAT launch sites and their inventory of ready-to-fire weapons, 
making all U S satellites, including critical early-warning satellites, pro­
gressively more vulnerable to attack
The U S plans to deploy its sophisticated miniature ASAT interceptor by 
1985 In addition, the US is in the process of developing ground- and air- 
based laser weapons that could be used against Soviet satellites in low-earth 
orbit The next step would be U S testing and deployment of space-based 
laser weapons designed to attack Soviet ASAT weapons The Soviets would 
likely react by intensifying and diversifying their ASAT weapons program. In 
the meantime, the U S would be racing to develop satellite defenses in an 
effort to protect U S satellites from the rapidly developing Soviet ASAT 
threat
The consequences of such an intense ASAT arms race are likely to steadily 
erode U S security for at least two reasons First, ASAT weapons are almost 
certain to defeat satellite defenses because ASAT weapons can be designed 
exclusively to attack satellites, whereas satellites must be designed to 
defend themselves in addition to performing their other functions Since the 
US is much more dependent on satellites than is the Soviet Union, it would 
be much worse off if neither country could count on using its satellites in a 
conflict Second, intense competition in the development and deployment of 
ASAT weaponry would divert resources from other defense programs vital to U S 
security, including measures to lessen the vulnerability of U S satellites 
The U S has already committed $3 6 billion to its current ASAT program, the 
General Accounting Office has reported that the program could end up costing 
$20-30 billion In addition, the U S would likely have to redesign its 
military satellite program. At present, U S military satellites are highly 
capable but are correspondingly complex and expensive They are typically 
designed for lifetimes of five to ten years whereas the less sophisticated 
Soviet satellites typically have much shorter lifetimes The Soviet satel­
lites can therefore be more readily replaced, and can be continually modified
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to counter the developing U S ASAT capability In contrast, U S satellites 
that could protect themselves on the day of launch might well become vulnera­
ble to a rapidly advancing Soviet ASAT capability within a few years As a 
result, the U S might be forced to launch satellites more frequently at 
correspondingly great cost An intense ASAT arms race is also bound to upset 
other nations that have their own satellites, particularly when weapons capa­
ble of attacking satellites in geosynchronous orbits are developed
The Future With an ASAT Agreement
The first step in sidetracking an ASAT weapons race would be to ban 
further testing of ASAT weapons With such a ban in place, Soviet efforts to 
improve their current primitive and unreliable interceptor or to develop new 
ASAT weapons would be blunted Tests of lasers or high-powered radio trans­
mitters capable of damaging satellite sensors or burning out satellite recei­
vers would be prevented The resources that would have been spent by the U S 
to develop a variety of sophisticated ASAT weapons could be spent on other 
activities A ban on ASAT tests in space would also strengthen the 1972 
antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty by preventing the Soviets from testing in 
space ABM weapons disguised as ASAT weapons The majority of the most impor­
tant US military satellites, which are not in low earth orbits, would remain 
relatively safe
The next step in safeguarding U S space assets would be to negotiate an 
agreement with the Soviets to dismantle existing ASAT weapons Such an agree­
ment appears possible because the Soviet Union has announced publicly its 
willingness to destroy its current ASAT weapons if a treaty banning ASAT 
weapons can be concluded Destruction of current Soviet ASAT weapons would 
increase the safety of U S satellites in low earth orbits
Summary
All of the declared objectives for which the U S  is developing ASAT 
weapons can, if they are desirable at all, be better achieved in other ways 
The missions of some U S satellites, such as the early warning satellites, 
are critical and cannot be carried out by any other means Without an ASAT 
agreement these and other U S satellites are likely to become increasingly 
vulnerable as the Soviet Union develops more and more sophisticated ASAT 
weapons As a result, the U S  is likely to find itself racing to try to 
protect its vital space assets but continually falling further behind the 
rapidly developing Soviet ASAT technology With an ASAT agreement Soviet ASAT 
technology would be frozen at a primitive and relatively ineffective level, 
critical U S early warning and other satellites that are not now threatened 
by the Soviet ASAT weapon would remain relatively safe, and U S steps to 
protect its satellites by hardening and diversification would be much more 
effective
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IV COULD AN ASAT TREATY BE VERIFIED9
Verification Difficulties
Verification of an agreement controlling or restricting ASAT weapons 
poses several special difficulties First, there is more of an incentive for 
marginal cheating than with other weapon systems Satellites are so few m  
number and their capabilities so difficult to duplicate on the ground that 
even a few effective ASAT weapons deployed in secret in violation of an 
agreement could provide the cheater with significant military advantage in a 
war
Second, the fragility of satellites means that many weapons that are not 
specifically designed for ASAT use, such as ground-based air and ballistic 
missile defense weapons as well as nuclear-armed offensive missiles, could 
have a significant ASAT caapability
Third, some civilian activities make use of vehicles with capabilities 
very similar to those needed by ASAT weapons Thus, for example, both the 
manned U S Space Shuttle and the unmanned Soviet Progrez space station re­
supply vehicle can be launched into an orbit near that of a satellite and can 
then be maneuvered alongside the satellite and brought into contact The 
terms of any ASAT ban cannot be so restricitve as to interfere significantly 
with accepted civilian uses of space
These considerations suggest that a treaty banning ASAT weapons should be 
accompanied by measures to decrease the vulnerability of critical military 
satellites and to increase the ability of the US to detect and monitor ASAT 
development and testing activities
Decreasing the Vulnerability of U S Satellites
Making important U S satellites less vulnerable not only would protect 
them but would also mean that in order to pose a significant threat, an ASAT 
weapon would have to be more capable and hence more easily distinguished from 
non-weapons or weapons intended for other purposes
Measures to decrease the vulnerability of U S satellites are in fact 
already being taken In May 1978, President Carter ordered that all future 
U S military satellites be designed to diminish the effects of any attack 
upon them Satellites can be hardened against the effects of radiation from 
nuclear explosions and their sensors can be hardened against blinding by 
lasers Satellites can also be equipped with onboard sensors to indicate when 
they are being actively tracked by an ASAT weapon, allowing the satellite to 
evade the attack The new KH-12 photographic reconnaissance satellite, for 
example, will be able to outmaneuver the current Soviet ASAT weapon
Nevertheless, some satellites (such as large optical reconnaissance sat­
ellites in low Earth orbits) probably cannot be protected from attack by 
future ASAT weapons at any affordable cost Furthermore, almost any satellite 
can be disabled by detonating a nuclear warhead near it For these reasons it 
is prudent to increase the chance that the needed capabilities will survive by 
deploying a large number of satellites, placing critical payloads on a variety
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of satellites, having replacement satellites ready for launch on short notice, 
and developing ground-based alternatives wherever possible
Measures such as these could insure that U S space assets will survive 
unless attacked by a sophisticated ASAT weapon capable of disabling a large 
number of satellites in a short period of time
U S Verification Needs and Capabilities
In order to be sure that the Soviet Union was not testing or deploying a 
sophisticated ASAT weapon, the U S would have to be able to ascertain with
confidence
(1) that a greatly improved version of the existing Soviet ASAT 
interceptor was not being tested against targets in space,
(2) that the Soviet Union was not testing any sophisticated new 
ASAT weapons in space or against targets in space,
(3) that weapons originally designed and deployed for other 
purposes were not being converted into sophisticated ASAT 
weapons, and
(4) that non-weapon space programs and vehicles do not pose a 
significant threat to satellites
How well could the U S detect these activities7 The North American 
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) already keeps track of the identities and 
current orbits of all (several thousand) objects of significant size in space 
NORAD s space tracking radar network has recently been upgraded to provide 
better tracking precision while gaps in the network have been closed by im­
proving old radars and installing new ones in the Pacific When completed in 
1987, the Ground-Based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) system 
will augment ground radars by providing precise, highly-detailed data on the 
optical appearance and orbits of man-made objects that are 3,000 or more miles
from Earth
The U S also maintains a variety of electronic and optical sensors 
around and above the Soviet Union that add to its ability to detect and 
classify Soviet missile and space launches Some of these were discussed in a 
previous article in this series
Whether these capabilites, and innovative new ones that will be put in 
place in the future would be adequate can best be judged by considering in 
turn each of the four verification tasks listed above
Possible Verification Challenges
The Reagan Administration has frequently argued (correctly) that it would 
be nearly impossible to verify the dismantling and destruction of existing 
Soviet ASAT interceptor satellites by national technical means alone The 
Administration then argues (incorrectly) that there is therefore no basis for 
limiting ASAT weapons The reality is that there is no need for a ban on
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possession of ASAT interceptor satellites, since a ban on testing, deployment, 
and use of the full Soviet ASAT system would be both sufficient for U S 
security needs and verifiable by national technical means (the launch vehicle 
is more tha 10 feet in diameter and 150 feet long, 30 feet longer than the 
largest Soviet ICBM) Worrying about Soviet possession of the much smaller 
interceptor satellites when the needed launch vehicle would be unavailable is 
like worrying about whether someone has bullets in his pocket when you know 
that he does not have a gun Without a gun, the bullets are of little use 
Similarly, without a launch vehicle, the Soviet interceptor satellite would be 
of little use
As discussed Section II, the current Soviet ASAT weapon poses only a 
minimal threat to current US military satellites and will pose even less of 
a threat to future ones Could it be significantly upgraded in secret7 The 
launch would be readily observable by early warning satellites In orbit, the 
interceptor would be tracked by the ground-based radars and cameras described 
above Its maneuvers would be readily distinguishable from the activities of 
other satellites The radio transmissions from the interceptor could be 
monitored by ground- and space-based sensors Taking into account the fact 
that the U S has had more than 15 years of experience monitoring tests of 
this very system, there is little chance that any meaningful tests would 
escape detection
If the Soviets hoped to increasse their ASAT capability covertly, a more 
likely course of action would be to attempt to develop an entirely new weapon 
Possibilities include a miniature homing ASAT weapon, like the U S  is cur­
rently testing, a laser ASAT weapon, or space mines
Whether Soviet technology is sufficiently advanced to make a miniature 
homing ASAT weapon feasible in the near term is not clear The technological 
challenges in building an effective space-based laser ASAT weapon are formida­
ble, even if unrestricted testing were permitted Covert development and 
testing would certainly be a protracted and highly risky task Ground- or 
air-based laser ASAT weapons would be far easier to construct but could only 
destroy satellites in low Earth orbits, a variety of countermeasures are 
available to minimize the damage that lasers could do to the sensors of 
satellites in higher orbits
To be effective, all of these weapons would require homing or aiming with 
very high precision It is doubtful that the Soviets could develop confidence 
in any of these weapons without testing them against targets in space But 
such tests would provide a host of telltale signs launch of the ASAT itself, 
the large flow of radio data from the test vehicles that would be required to 
evaluate their performance, visible damage to the target satellite such as 
fragmentation or tumbling, heating of the target which can be detected by 
infrared sensors, and displacement of the target satellites orbit
Space mines, which are weapons placed in orbit near their targets and 
exploded when war begins, probably could not be deployed without detection 
In their simplest forms they could be adequately tested on the ground and 
disguised as ordinary satellites However, to be effective against satellites 
in low Earth orbits simple mines would have to be placed in an orbit very 
close to that of their target and would have to closely follow the maneuvers 
of the target While one or two such mines might escape detection, deployment 
of space mines in numbers sufficient to cover the various orbits occupied by
14
the dozens of U S military satellites would be obvious More complex mines 
might be able to start from a more distant orbit and maneuver to attack the 
target, but would be both very expensive and difficult to disguise
Space mines designed to attack satellites in geosynchronous orbits face 
similar difficulties All satellites at such altitudes are supposed to be 
registered under the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space and must maintain minimum separations from other satellites A 
space mine becomes complex, expensive, and distinctive when it must be able to 
move quickly from an orbit far from that of its target in order to attack
What about conversion of weapons not originally designed as ASAT weapons’ 
Long US experience at monitoring the characteristic patterns of Soviet ICBM 
and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) tests would make it risky for the Soviet 
Union to test these weapons in ways that would be useful in developing their 
ASAT capability Of course, even in the absence of tests the current modest 
ASAT capabilities of such weapons would have to be taken into account
The Soviet Union has several space vehicles, such as the manned Soyuz 
spacecraft and its unmannned Progrez resupply craft, that were not designed as 
weapons but could disable a few low-altitude satellites The same is true of 
the US manned Space Shuttle The minimal ASAT capabilites of these systems 
do not pose a significant threat to U S or Soviet space assets The continu­
ing high cost of space launches will force designers to optimize civilia 
space vehicles for their intended missions with the result that they are 
unlikely to have significant ASAT capabilities The U S would want to moni­
tor the use of such space vehicles to verify that they were not being tested 
in ways that would significantly enhance their ASAT capabilities
An ASAT treaty could help to limit the threat posed by non-weapon systems 
by mandating certain cooperative measures, such as limitations on the speed of 
approach in rendezvous maneuvers or the power-aperture product of lasers used 
in space An ASAT agreement could include an agreement to address future 
concerns on a case-by-case basis in the STanding Consultative Commission 
This approach would raise U S confidence that Soviet civilian space vehicles 
were not being readied as ASAT weapons while minimizing the impact of the 
treaty on space exploration
Summary
The US should diversify and harden its most critical military satel­
lites while at the same time deploying new technology for detecting ASAT 
weapons as it becomes available With these steps, it appears possible to 
write an arms control agreement banning the testing, deployment, and use o 
ASAT weapons that would be adequately verifiable The US should urgently
pursue such an agreement with the Soviet Union This is not only the most
prudent approach but the only one that is likely to be effective in protecting
crucial U S space assets
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V CONCLUSION
The U S  is currently in a situation very similar to the one it faced in 
the late 1960 s and early 1970 s with respect to multiple, independently- 
targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) Then, the U S short-sightedly pressed 
ahead with MIRVs to capitalize on its temporary lead in MIRV technology with­
out considering the long-term consequences of such a move As a result of 
this mistake, the U S  is far less secure today than it was in the late 
1960 s
Today, the U S  is pressing ahead with the testing and deployment of a 
second-generation anti-satellite weapon that is much more sophisticated than 
anything the Soviets have tested, in order to capitalize on its current lead 
in ASAT technology Unless this decision is reversed and a ban on testing and 
deployment of ASAT weapons is negotiated with the Soviets, the US will end 
up still less secure some years hence when the Soviets develop an effective 
ASAT weapon
The military purposes that have been proposed for a U S ASAT weapon are 
either unnecessary or can be achieved better by other means The crucial 
point, however, is that the U S relies heavily on satellites for early warn­
ing of any Soviet attack and for military communications The functions that 
these satellites perform cannot be carried out by any other means The U S 
ASAT weapon cannot protect these satellites it can only attack Soviet satel­
lites Thus, the most prudent approach, and the only one that is likely to be 
effective in protecting these crucial U S satellites, is for the U S  to 
negotiate an arms control agreement banning further testing or deployment of 
ASAT weapons
With an ASAT agreement Soviet ASAT technology would be constrained at a 
primitive and relatively ineffective level, critical U S early warning and 
other satellites that are not now threatened by the Soviets would remain 
relatively safe, and U S steps to protect its satellites by hardening and 
diversification would be much more effective The U S should take such steps 
while at the same time deploying new satellites and other technology for 
detecting and monitoring Soviet ASAT testing activity With such a three-part 
program, an arms control agreement banning the testing, deployment, and use of 
ASAT weapons would be adequately verifiable
The Soviets, clearly worried about the increasing vulnerability of their 
own satellites, appear willing to call a halt to ASAT activity Within the 
past year they have proposed a moratorium on ASAT testing, have called for a 
ban on ASAT weapons, and have offered to dismantle their current ASAT weapon, 
which is so large and cumbersome that it can be easily counted by U S nation­
al technical means However, the Reagan Administration, reversing what had 
been U S national policy through four previous administrations, has refused 
even to talk about such an agreement In complete contrast to the crude, 
first-generation Soviet ASAT weapon, the current, highly sophisticated U S 
ASAT weapon is so small that it cannot be adequately counted by national 
technical means Thus, once it has been successfully tested against a target 
in space, there will be no basis for the Soviets to agree to a ban on deploy­
ment of ASAT weapons, since they would have no way of knowing whether the U S 
was complying with such an agreement
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The best policy for the U S to follow now would be to join immediately 
the current Soviet moratorium on ASAT testing and then to resume urgent nego­
tiations with the Soviets to achieve a treaty banning testing, deployment, and 
use of ASAT weapons Even though President Reagan has recently reaffirmed his 
complete lack of interest in such an agreement, sentiment in both the House 
and the Senate in favor of such a course is so strong that it may compel him 
to resume the negotiations that he has so far rejected
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